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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
B. J. ANDERSON,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No.
10,794

vs.

EUNICE SHUMWAY,
Defendant and
Respondent
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a personal injury action arising out of
an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury
found the issues in favor of the defendant, no cause
of action.
Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial was denied
by the lower court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks that the verdict of the jury and
1

the denial of his Motion For New Trial be reversed
and that the case be remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement Of Facts contained in the Brief
of Appellant does not state all of the facts and gives
only his version as to how this accident happened.
He was the loser below. These facts should be stated,
"not merely as the appellant contends them to be,
but view, as they must on appeal, favorable to the
verdict of the jury." Thus a further Statement Of
Facts is in order.
The automobile accident that gave rise to this
action occurred at about 4 :30 o'clock p.m. on November 12, 1964. It had rained during the day and
at this time the rain had changed to sleet or snow.
The rnadway where the accident happened was wet.
The place where the accident happened is east of
Orem, Utah, in Utah County. Fourth South Street
in Orem, Utah, goes directly east from Highway
91 to top of a bluff some distance from Orem and
then makes a sharp right turn downhill on an access
road to the roads below which are in the Provo River
area. The accident between the vehicles of plaintiff
and defendant occurred on this curve. The scene of
the accident can best be understood by reference to
the two photographs reproduced below which were
"Exhibits 4 and 6". "Exhibit 4" shows the direction
of defendant's vehicle and "Exhibit 6" shows the
direction of plaintiff's vehicle. There is no center
line marked on the roadway.

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 6
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It should be noted at this point that this curve
is a blind curve and visibility of approaching traffic
is essentially blocked out until a vehicle is into the
curve. The improved portion of the roadway is approximately 21 feet in width and there is a gravel
shoulder on each side of the road (Ex. P-1) .

We turn now to the testimony of the two parties
involved in this accident (there were no eye witnesses other than the two drivers).
Plaintiff - Plaintiff testified that he had gotten off work about 4 :00 o'clock p.m. and had driven
from the Geneva Steel Works to Orem and then
from U.S. 91 in Orem east on Fourth South to the
place where this accident happened. He was alone
in his white 1959 Oldsmobile automobile (Tr. 65).
He testified that the weather was raining, turning
to sleet or snow, and that his windshield was clear
and he could see. He was approaching the intersection at approximately 20 miles per hour and slowed
down as he entered the right hand turn to the south
(Tr. 66). At that time he testified that he first saw
the approaching car of defendant some 200 feet
away, traveling in the center of the road and coming directly toward him. He stated that he was almost stopped when the impact occurred and that the
impact was a head-on glancing type collision. The
front end of defendant's car struck the front end
of his car. (Tr. 88). The defendant's car continued
4

around the curve and was stopped facing west on
Fourth South Street.
Defendant - Mrs. Eunice Shumway, the defendant, was employed on this day doing day work
for a Mrs. Harvey King at his residence at Elm
Circle in Provo, Utah (Tr. 200). She owned a 1954
Mercury two door autmobile, which was the vehicle
involved in this accident. She resided at Lindon,
Utah (Tr. 200). Mrs. Shumway was on her way
home from work at the time this accident happened.
She testified that it was raining hard and that
it was difficult to see. The lights on her Mercury
were on at the time of the accident (Tr. 201-202).
Mrs. Shumway testified that as she proceeded upgrade toward this curve the right wheels of her car
were on the gravel and at the time of the collision
her car was entirely on the right side of the center
line. Her testimony in this regard is as follows:
"Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

As you approached this intersection just
tell us in your own words what happened?
Well, it was raining real hard. I was
driving quite slow. It was hard for me
to see, and as I got up there I just started to making the turn as this car hit,
and I stopped.
Did you see the car of Mr. Anderson before the impact?
No, sir, I did not.
Where was your vehicle in relation to
this intersection when the accident happened?
5

A.

It was on the side of the road. As I went
up the road I kept my one wheel off on
the gravel.
Q. Let me ask you this question: Where was
your car at the time of this accident in
relationship to what we might call the
center line of the roadway?
A. It was on the side of the road.
Q. Which side?
A. On the right side."
(Tr. 202-203)

It is evident from the testimony of the two parties involved that they view the happening of this
accident in complete opposition. The plaintiff claims
that the defendant struck him head-on at a time
when his vehicle was partially off the road on his
side of the road. The defendant on the other hand
states that her vehicle was entirely on her side of
the road when the accident happened. Under the
point of argument in this case it will be shown conclusively that the plaintiff's version of how the accident happened is inherently improbable.
The only other person who has any knowledge
of this accident was the investigating officer, Sgt.
J. Reed Burgener, of the Orem City Police. He arrived at the scene of the accident and observed the
two vehicles, and found that the plaintiff's vehicle
had made a right turn and was facing south and
that the defendants vehicle had made the turn and
was then facing west on the 4th south street.
6

He first inquired as to whether either of the
drivers had been injured. He had some conversation
with both drivers but was vague as to what they
told him concerning the accident. (Tr. 53) He then
had the plaintiff, Mr. Anderson, assist him in an
investigation of the roadway. It was raining and
visibility was poor. (Tr. 53). Mr. Anderson held
the tape at the edge of the blacktop on the access
road and the officer measured a paved roadway of
21 feet (Tr. 54). He testified that he found some
mud on the roadway in the vicinity of the vehicle of
the plaintiff, and testified that it was more than 13
feet from the east side of the blacktop which would
put it in the lane of travel of the plaintiff. (Tr. 31).
The officer could not determine the probable point
of impact between the two vehicles. There were no
skid marks from either vehicle. (Tr. 29). All he
found was some mud and dirt on the roadway in the
vicinity of the vehicle of plaintiff and in his opinion
it came from the vehicles involved in the accident.
(Tr. 30) . He very candidly admitted also that he
could have made a determination from both vehic"les
to find where the dirt and mud had come from, if
in fact it had dropped from under one of the vehicles, but he did not do this. (Tr. 45) He also testified that he did not know from which vehicle the
mud had come and admitted that it could have come
from any point underneath either car. His testimony
was of little assistance to the jury in enabling it to
7

determine which of these vehicles had encroached on
the lane of travel of the other.
The case was then submitted to the jury on
proper instructions of negligence and contributory
negligence and the jury returned a verdict in favor
of the defendant.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE THIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY TO THE
JURY.

The plaintiff-appellant lists three points of
argument namely, that the Court erred in failing
to direct a verdict on the issue of liability and in
submitting the issues of plaintiffs contributory negligence and defendant's negligence to the jm·y. Reduced to their essence the argument of plaintiff is
that the Court erred in submitting the issue of liability to the jury. The facts of this case viewed within the framework of legal principles repeatedly announced by this Court will show that the argument
of plaintiff must fail. He caused the accident. The
jury so found.
In the case of W eenig Bros. vs. Manning, 1
Utah 2d 101, 262 Pacific 2d 491, this Court stated:
"In order to upset the judgment and
command one in its favor, the first obstacle
plaintiff must overcome is to demonstrate
that the evidence shows with such certainty
that reasonable minds could not differ thereon that the defendant was guilty of negli8

gence which proximately caused the collision.
In the absence of such degree of proof we
could not direct that such finding be made
and reverse the decision of the lower court.
The defendant having prevailed, on conflicting matters the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to him."
An in the case of Larson vs. Evans, 12 Utah 2d,
245, 364 Pacific 2d 1088, our Court said:
"The major issue thus presented is: Was
the evidence so compelling against a finding
of contributory negligence on the part of Jon
Larson as to require a finding on the question
in his favor as a matter of law? In order to
upset the verdict and command one in the
plaintiffs' favor the evidence must show with
such certainty that reasonable minds could
not differ thereon that the plaintiff, Jon Larson, merely did what a prudent person would
have done under the circumstances. The defendant having prevailed below, the evidence
on conflicting matters must be view in the
light most favorable to him."
Applicable also is the statement of this Court
in the case of Ewan vs. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272,
399 Pacific 2d 210:
"In order to justify the trial court's dismissal, the evidence must show with sufficient
certainty that reasonable minds would not
differ thereon that plaintiff was negligent
and that her negligence was a proximate
cause of her injury. It should be borne in mind
that the defendant has the burden of proving
both of those issues by a preponderance of
the evidence. Consequently, if there is any
9

reasonable basis in the evidence, or from lack
of evidence, upon which fairminded jurors
could reasonably remain unconvinced on either or both of those issues, then the trial court
was not justified in ruling against her as a
matter of law."
Appropriate also is the statement of Justice
Henriod in his concurring opinion in the case of
Badger v. Clayson, ______ Utah 2d ______ , 422 Pacific
2d 665:
"The crux of this case revolves around
one instruction given by the court supplemented by interrogatories presented to the
jury. The jury decided six to two in favor of
Clayson. Had this writer been on the jury, he
is inclined to the conclusion reached by the
two dissenting jurors. But that cannot substitute for our jury system."
With the above principles in mind our next inquiry must be into the facts, viewed as they must
be, favorable to the defendant, and then determine
if there was sufficient evidence before the lower
court to justify submission of the issue of liability
of the jury on conflicting facts and inferences.
The accident happened November 12, 1964 at
approximately 4 :30 p.m. It had rained during the
day and at this hour in the vicinity of this accident
the rain was turning to sleet and snow. It was overcast and misty and visibility was poor according to
the investigating officer. The plaintiff was driving
a 1959 Oldsmobile automobile, white in color. He
10

i
did not have his headlights on. (Tr. 88). The defendant on the other hand did have her headlights
on, (Tr. 202) , and she had dimmed her lights on her
way from where she worked to where this accident
happened (Tr. 202). We may reasonably infer
from this testimony that headlights on this day and
at that time were necessary. We may also infer that
the plaintiff's white automobile without headlights
presented a difficult object for an approaching motorist to see.
The roadway on which the plaintiff was traveling before the accident goes straight east from U.S.
91 in Orem, Utah, to the top of the bench and then
turns sharply to the right and downhill to the river
bottom. The so called "access road" from this is only
21 feet in width and would be classified as a narrow
road. The area of the accident is difficult to describe
in words and can best be seen pictorially from the
photographs that have been reproduced in this brief.
These views show this particular corner from the
direction each driver was traveling and give a fair
representation of the visibility that each driver had.
The curve is essentially blind - approaching drivers have no opportunity to see one another until the
turn is completed.
The plaintiff's theory of the case supported by
his testimony only, is that he approached the curve
traveling approximately 20 miles per hour and slowed down somewhat as he entered the turn. At that
11

moment he observed the approaching vehicle of the
defendant, some 200 feet away and noted that she
was encroaching on his half of the roadway. He was
traveling approximately 15 miles an hour when he
was struck headon. (Tr. 88-90).
Contrasted to the testimony of the plaintiff is
that of the defendant concerning her position on
the roadway when this accident occurred. Her testimony was clear and explicit - that as she proceeded
northbound up this access roadway she was entirely
on her side of the road, and, in fact, because of its
narrowness her practice was to have her right
wheels off the paved portion onto the shoulder. She
had just reached the top of the hill and had started
to turn when her vehicle was struck by the plaintiff.
She testified that at all times while proceeding up
this access road her car was on her side of the road
and was on her side of the road at the time she was
struck by the plaintiff.
There were no skid marks leading up to a probable point of impact and the only other evidence is
that of the investigating officer who found some
mud on the road but made no attempt to find out
which part of which car the mud came from, and
indeed, it could have come from under either car
and from any point under either car.
The testimony of the defendant is entirely consistent with the exercise of due care. She was traveling at a reasonable rate of speed ( 25 miles per hour)
12

and she was traveling on her side of the road. Admittedly, she did not see the plaintiff's vehicle until
impact but this is explained due to the fact that this
was a blind curve; that plaintiff was driving a
white vehicle with its lights off against a background of sleet and snow. These facts are not sufficient for a jury to find negligence on the part of
the defendant.
We turn now to the negligence of the plaintiff.
These facts are established: Plaintiff was driving a
white Oldsmobile against a background of snow and
sleet. He did not have his lights on and it is apparent
from the testimony of the defendant that lights were
necessary on account of the weather. He had reduced his speed from approximately 20 miles an hour
as he proceeded east to 15 miles an hour as he rounded the turn and started downhill. He testified that
the collision was a head-on glancing collision. Under
these circumstances we would expect to find front
end damage to both vehicles. The front end of his
car was damaged. This is shown by the repair bill
introduced in evidence (Exhibit 10) which shows
that the left front headlight of his car was replaced.
However, when we view the two photographs of the
defendant's vehicle which have been reproduced
herein, we see immediately that the damage to the
defendant's vehicle was not on the left front but
rather on the left fender behind the headlight. The
13
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attitude of the two vehicles on impact is apparent
from the damage that was done. The vehicle of defendant was traveling straight and the vehicle of
plaintiff was angled in such a way that the left
front corner of plaintiff's vehicle struck the left
fender of defendant's vehicle. This is exactly what
would be expected of a vehicle that was making a
sharp turn to the right as was plaintiff and had
encroached over the center line. These physical facts
are entirely consistent with the testimony of the defendan t. On the other hand, however, they show
that the accident could not have occurred as plaintiff suggests. He testified that his vehicle was partially off the road and against the bank when he
was struck a glancing, head-on blow by the defendant. Were this the case we would have found damage on the front end of the defendant's car. There
was none.
He testified further that he had an opportunity
to observe the defendant's car for some 200 feet and
that it came straight toward him. The only possible
way that the accident could have produced the damage it did was for the vehicle of the defendant to
have been entirely in his lane of travel and suddenly
have made a sharp turn to the right just before the
two cars impacted. This is the only way that defendant could have avoided front end damage. There is
no testimony that this is the way the collision occurred and the only conclusion that can be drawn is
that the accident did not happen in the way that
plaintiff testified.
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There was ample evidence before the jury that
the defendant was not negligent as alleged by plaintiff and ample evidence before the jury that the
plaintiff was negligent in the manner that he operated his vehicle. At most, the evidence was conflicting and reasonable men could reach different conclusions. Such being the case a clear jury question
was presented and the jury resolved these issues
against the plaintiff.
A Utah case very similar to the case at bar is
Moser vs. Z.C.M.I., 114 Utah 58, 197 Pac. 2d 136:
The accident in this case happened approximately
l:Y2 miles south of Logan, Utah, on the highway
between Logan and Ogden. It happened about 7 :30 '
p.m. October 10, 1945. It had rained during the day
and the road was wet. It was dark and both vehicles
had their headlights on. The roadway at the point
of collision was approximately 22 feet in width.
The collision between the two vehicles occurred just
south of a highway bridge. The plaintiff testified
that as the defendant's south-bound truck crossed
the bridge it jerked slightly, then came into the
plaintiff's lane of travel and turned to the right
just before impact and that plaintiff struck the left
rear of defendant's truck. The defendant's driver
testified that as the north-bound vehicle of plaintiff
approached him that it gradually encroached in his
lane of travel and that he moved as far to the right
as he could and actually scraped the bridge abutment and after he left the bridge he turned his ve16

hicle furthe1· to the right at which time he was
st1·uck by the plaintiff. The investigating officer
testified that the1·e we1·e tire tracks on the right
shoulder of the mad which lead from the bridge to
the barrnw-pit where the defendant's vehicle was
ove1·turnecl. This, of course, would indicate that defendant's vehicle was on its right side of the road
when the accident happened. However, the officer
also testified that there was nothing on the highway
that would indicate a point of collision. There was
no evidence that either driver made any application
of brakes. There were no skid marks found at the
scene of the accident.
The evidence of the parties in this lawsuit was
conflicting. Both claimed that the other had encroached on the wrong side of the highway. Our
Court announced the following principle:
"The ultimate question of fact in this
case, is of com·se, which of the two drivers
failed to keep his vehicle upon his proper side
of the mad. It is clear that at least one of
them crossed the center line. The determination of this ultimate fact was for the jury.
And the jm·y having determined this question
in plaintiff's favor, and the trial Court having denied defendant's motion for new trial,
this Court cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion unless there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict, or in
other words, that all reasonable minds must
agree that it was plaintiff, and not defendant,
Rogers, who transgressed the center line of
the highway."
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The Court then commented on the respective
theories and evidence of the parties and concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict in favor of plaintiff. The verdict and judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
An ear lier Utah case to the same effect is
Cheney vs. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 Pacific 81. This
was an automobile-bicycle accident that occurred
in Layton, Utah. Each of the parties contended that
the other had failed to yield half the traveled portion of the highway. In this regard the Court held:

"It is undisputed that the respondent
was not going over four miles per hour on his
bicycle. That he was on the right side of the
traveled road seems well established, but
whether he was not was for the jury to say,
not for the Court."
These Utah cases establish the proposition that
where there is evidence from which a jury could
find that one or the other, or both, of two vehicles
involved in a collision, had encroached over the center line, then the question of liability is one for the
JUry.

The trial judge correctly applied these principles to this case. He committed no error in submitting the issue of liability to the jury.
Cases from other jurisdictions support the legal
conclusion set forth above. For analogous cases see
Poston vs. Clinton, 406 Pac. 2d 623 (Wash.). This
accident involved two vehicles that collided head-on
18

on a paved highway divided by a white center strip.
Each driver claimed that the other had encroached
on his side of the highway and each claimed that the
negligence of the other had caused the accident. In
regard to the issue of liability the Court stated:
"On the first point, we think the trial
court properly refused to grant a directed
verdict in favor of the appellants. The evidence with reference to the point of impact
consisted of circumstantial evidence (such as
the debris on the highway, a long gouge in
the pavement evidently made by the Clinton
automobile, the position of the cars after the
accident), the testimony of eyewitnesses and
expert witnesses as to the point of impact.
There was sufficient evidence from which the
jury, as trier of the fact, could find that the
point of impact was in either the northerly
or southerly traffic lane or the jury could
have believed that there was no preponderance of evidence in favor of either side."
The jury verdict in favor of defendant was reversed on other grounds.
In Roth vs. Spelts, 326 Pac. 2d 80 (Colo.) the
two approaching vehicles collided on a curve. Averdict for plaintiffs was affirmed on appeal, the Court
noting:
"The facts and circumstances relating to
the conduct of the parties at the time and immediately preceding the impact, and questions
concerning the credibility of the several witnesses, presented questions which could only
be resolved by the jury. To justify the with19

drawal of a case from the jury, not only
should the facts be undisputed, but the conclusions to be drawn from those facts should
be indisputable.
The jury determined that the accident
was the proximate result of the negligence
of defendants and resolved the issue of contributory negligence against them, all of this
under instructions which are not challenged."
(It should be noted that the appellant in the
case at bar does not challenege the Court's instructions.)
For numerous other cases supporting the proposition set forth above see Digest Key No. 245
( 13). (Automobiles).
CONCLUSION
The accident in this case occurred about 4 :30
p.m. on November 12, 1964. Visibility was poor; it
had been raining and the rain was turning to sleet
and snow at the time the accident happened. The
accident happened on a curve on a roadway that
proceeds east from Orem to the top of the bluff and
then makes a sharp right turn downhill to the river
bottom roads below. The curve is a blind curve. Approaching drivers do not have visibility, one of the
other, until the turn is almost completed. The roadway is also quite narrow being only approximately
21 feet in width. There are no center lines marking
the road. The plaintiff was driving a white Oldsmobile without his lights on, although the evidence
20

would support the conclusion that lights were necessary at that time.
The defendant testified that as she went uphill

from the river bottom road her car was entirely on

1

her side of the road and it stayed on her side of the
road up to the impact. Plaintiff on the other hand
testified that he observed the approaching car of
defendant and that she had crossed the center line
some distance before the accident and that he had
pulled to the right and was struck essentially headon. This presents a clear conflict of fact to be resolved by the jury. The ultimate question was which of
these drivers had transgressed the center line and
this question, as in the Moser case, (Supra) was for
the jury.
We also point out that when the physical evidence of damage on the two vehicles is considered
the theory of plaintiff as to how the accident happened is not suppm'ted. The damage on his car was
on the left front corner. The damage on the vehicle
of defendant was behind the left headlight on the
left fender. There was no damage on the front end
and this is clearly seen by the Exhibits reproduced
in this brief. Had this collision been a head-on collision as suggested by plaintiff then surely one
would expect to find damage on the front end of
both cars. The most i·easonable explanation for the
accident is that the plaintiff encroached over the
cente1· line as he was making a right turn and the
left front of his car struck the left fender of the de21

fendant's car at an angle. This physical evidence of
damage is consistent with the testimony of defendant but not consistent with the testimony of plaintiff. The jury verdict in favor of the defendant is
amply supported by this evidence and the trial court
was entirely justified in submitting the issue of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury.
The verdict and judgment of the lower court
must be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. GARRETT, for
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
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